This paper refracts Gordon Tullock's The Social Dilemma onto a framework of spontaneous order theorizing, and finds the refraction to work well. The Social Dilemma reveals Gordon Tullock to be a theorist whose conceptualizations are anchored in a societal setting represented better by networks than by fields, and where societal outcomes emerge out of local networked interaction. The theoretical orientation of The Social Dilemma is redolent with spontaneous order themes, including his adoption of a field of vision that looks for social order west of Babel and not east of Eden. The paper also makes some secondary effort to compare The Social Dilemma with James Buchanan's The Limits of Liberty.
The purpose of this paper is to show the congruence between Gordon Tullock's The Social Dilemma and the theoretical core of spontaneously emergent processes of social ordering that is associated particularly strongly with the Scottish Enlightenment.
1 During this exploration of Tullock's roots in spontaneous order theorizing, I shall also offer a few comparisons with James
Buchanan's The Limits of Liberty. I do this for several reasons. First, the organizers of this Symposium asked that I do so. Second, Buchanan (1987) locates Tullock not as a theorist within the tradition of spontaneous order but as a theorist of homo economicus. Third, both books treat the same topic and were written about the same time, so it seems worthwhile to give some thought to similarities and differences between the two authors of the epochal The Calculus of Consent. Fourth, I have accumulated some intellectual capital on the topic, in that I have previously published appreciative essays on both Buchanan (Wagner 1987a ) and Tullock (Wagner 1987b) , as well as publishing a reflective essay (Wagner 2004) on the scholarly milieu they generated during their academic association over a third of a century.
I do not proceed in exegetical fashion by presenting a Reader's Guide to
The Social Dilemma. An interested reader can do this easily. Rather, I place primary emphasis on exploring the theory of spontaneous order in relation to the conceptual framework on which The Social Dilemma rests. A person can be a creative economic and social theorist without thinking or writing much about methodology. Tullock has proceeded in this manner, as it is hard to find much by 2 way of explicit methodology within his scholarly oeuvre. Yet Tullock, as any theorist, operates with underlying principles that govern his selection of material and the manner in which he explores that material. An examination of the foundations that support The Social Dilemma shows clearly that Tullock theorizes from a spontaneous order orientation.
A large part of my effort involves an elaboration of the framework of spontaneous order theorizing about social order in a way that reveals the spontaneous order core of Tullock's The Social Dilemma. What I attempt here is an imaginative act of scholarly bridging to connect two points of anchorage: (1) Tullock's The Social Dilemma and (2) the conceptual core of spontaneous order theorizing. Tullock's scholarly oeuvre contains no extended discussion of spontaneous order nor does the term appear in the Index to his Selected Works;
nonetheless, The Social Dilemma reflects a deep understanding and appreciation of spontaneous order theorizing.
Setting the Scene
The Calculus of Consent quickly became a classic after its 1962 publication through its ability to articulate and inspire scholarly inquiry in what subsequently became known as public choice. As the authors noted in their Preface, the work was genuinely a joint product as each author worked on each chapter, with in many cases chapters going back-and-forth several times between the authors. The only indication of divergence appeared in their separate appendixes: Buchanan wrote about some precursors in political 3 philosophy; Tullock wrote about some theorists who sought to develop a positive political theory. Those appendixes aside, it might seem as though those authors were unified in their underlying vision of social order and its problematical features.
Over the subsequent decade, Buchanan and Tullock published a good number of items jointly as well as each producing their customary torrent of individual manuscripts. Nothing they ever did again matched the influence of
The Calculus of Consent, but one such work in a lifetime is more than most of us will ever experience. By the early 1970s, both authors were in Blacksburg at VPI. Anarchy was a topic of intense examination at the time, leading to two books edited by Tullock (1972 . This scholarly milieu also led to Buchanan also from his subtitle and to extend it. There is a good deal of complementarity in these works, but also some significant differences in orientation. They were published about the same time, and both were organized around the prisoners'
dilemma. Yet the theoretical orientations they take to their material differ in subtle but significant ways.
When Nicolaas Vriend (2002) asked "Was Hayek an Ace?" he was engaging in an activity similar to what I am undertaking here. Vriend's reference to "Ace," it should be noted, was to agent-based computational modeling, which is described nicely in Mitchel Resnick (1994) and illustrated in action in Joshua Epstein and Robert Axtell (1996) . Agent-based modeling provides a framework for allowing individual agents to differ in what they know and how they act, and with aggregate, societal-level formations emerging out of local interaction among such agents, in contrast to their being stipulated in advance through some postulation of societal equilibrium. Ace; moreover, Aces necessarily must be spontaneous order theorists.
Alternative Windows for Social Theorizing: Mengerian and Walrasian
People who think about objects like trees or frogs can apprehend their objects directly by inspection. People who think about objects like economy or polity or society cannot do so without the preceding adoption of some conceptual framework that brings that object into view. The properties possessed by that object depend on the window through which it is viewed. Social phenomena, 6 unlike material objects, are not directly apprehensible by the senses, but can be perceived only through some prior conceptual framework or analytical window. A particular grocery store can be apprehended directly, as can the shopping center in which it stands. So, too, for that matter, can a city hall, a police station, a church, or a country club. Such objects as these reside inside the objects we denote as economy, polity, or society but do not constitute those objects. To be sure, most scholarly discourse takes place by treating their objects as if they were directly apprehensible, which seems to render unproblematic such objects as polity or economy, as distinct from particular material reflections of those objects. But this is just ordinary economizing action through following established convention. Economists speak continually of markets and market economies; nonetheless, the articulation of the central features of that object depends upon some preceding conceptual articulation of the nature of that object, even though it is possible for someone to enter into on-going dialogue without engaging explicitly in such articulation.
With respect to contemporary economic theorizing, there are two prime windows for viewing economic phenomena. Wagner (2007) Meaning can't be ascertained from a snapshot, for snapshots cannot provide testimony about the processes that are generating our observations of societal phenomena.
The Mengerian window is congruent with spontaneous order theorizing;
the Walrasian window is not. Within the Walrasian window, orderliness is presumed to exist, but that orderliness is itself in no way an object to be explained or understood. In contrast, the Mengerian window offers insight into the processes through which orderly patterns emerge and change. Spontaneous 
Spontaneous Order as Emergence-Based Theorizing
While theorizing about spontaneous orders will always entail processes where time passes, the passing of time is not sufficient for spontaneous order theorizing to be suitable. What is also necessary is locally and not globally generated action by the constituent units of the relevant social formation. For this, society must be conceptualized in terms of networks of incomplete connectivity and not in terms of fields of complete connectivity, a distinction elaborated in Potts (2000, pp. 55-81) . With a field, each node is connected directly to each other node. For a network, each node is connected only to some of the other nodes.
Consider two views of two streets seen through the Mengerian window.
One street is named Marching Street, the other Shopping Street. Along both streets a large number of people are observed to be moving in orderly and intelligible fashion. The only difference in the two views is that the coordination among people seems more complete on Marching Street than it does on Shopping Street. On Marching Street everyone arrives at their destination exactly as they had anticipated; this outcome assimilates nicely to a model of competitive equilibrium. On Shopping Street not everyone finds their movement to proceed as they had anticipated; the movement would appear to be imperfectly coordinated when compared against the movement along Marching
Street.
This point of this illustration, I should note, is not to invoke market failure on Shopping Street and to argue for trying to make Shopping Street look more like Marching Street, though a great deal of contemporary economic analysis proceeds in this fashion. To the contrary, my point is ontological in character, and concerns the need to operate with a theoretical framework that is suitable for the object of theorization. Two distinct types of motion are being observed on the two streets, and these call for distinct theoretical frameworks to render intelligible the societal patterns being observed.
What is being observed on Marching Street is a parade. The parade is equilibrated, with the parade marshal serving as the auctioneer. As a participant you will know within a minute or two when you will reach the end of the route; as Spontaneous order should not be analogized to spontaneous combustion, and it is perhaps unfortunate that the two terms are so similar. Spontaneous combustion refers to combustion without intentionality, as when a pile of rotting grass ignites due to the generation of heat. Spontaneous order theorizing has nothing to do with spontaneous combustion. Tullock (2005, pp. 201-24) gives extensive consideration to claims of spontaneous combustion in human societies and finds such claims to be nonsensical precisely because such claims do not allow for the intentionality that is necessary for societal motion. Tullock's particular object of examination is the claim that sometimes a popular uprising just happens for no particular reason, much as rotting grass might suddenly catch fire. Being a good Humean skeptic, Tullock does not assert that a popular rising is beyond any possible pale of imagination, but rather notes that no such rising has yet been sighted. Behind societal motion of any form will reside intention, typically multiple intentions whose interaction generates the phenomenon being observed.
Spontaneous order in human societies refers to unintended qualities of the interaction among intentions. Spontaneous order does not come into play when theorizing pursues a field-based notion of equilibrium, as is followed by much contemporary economic theorizing. An economist who works exclusively with maximizing models of homo economicus outside of any concern with interaction, such as characterizes equilibrium-based theorizing, is not a spontaneous order Hobbes-like formulation conveys the idea that while both parties prefer peace to war, they also don't want to be caught napping while the other party attacks, and so war prevails over peace (or at least peace is only a temporary and not a permanent condition). All theorizing requires a theorist who contemplates an object, so some detachment or distance must be created between the theorist and the object. The theorist is a spectator to and not a participant within the object being analyzed. A cardinal feature of spontaneous order theorizing nonetheless is for the theorist to seek to render intelligible the phenomena being But game theory can also be approached from the inside looking out. In this case the fate dictated by the original game matrix does not necessarily control the players and the outcomes they realize, because the players can speak back as it were. In doing this, the game matrix can be transformed in various possible ways. What allows for numerous possible story lines to be developed from this simple template occurs when we move inside the model.
Often this transformation occurs in ways that are not even noticed. The original prisoners' dilemma, for instance, is not adequately represented by the Hobbes-like dilemma because the original formulation had three players and not two.
There were two prisoners who were put into the situation described by the dilemma by a district attorney. So a full description of the situation requires three people, one of whom forces the other two into the situation described by the PD matrix, and with those other two being reluctant duelists.
The situation is different if we start with just two people in the first place, as the Hobbes-like formulations do. In the original illustration, the district attorney stood apart from the prisoners and imposed the game matrix on them.
But if we take away the district attorney, what remains? We observe two people who fight for awhile and then quit, one perhaps significantly more battered than the other. What do we conclude from this observation? One framework to impose is the PD framework. But what makes this framework so compelling? Or is it really so compelling?
Put differently, is it truly possible to recognize a PD situation, other than its imposition onto some set of people by some outside figure, as illustrated by the original illustration? We observe two people fighting, and that is all we observe.
It's understandable that a post-fight interview might show the loser expressing regret. And even the winner might, and yet these twin observations wouldn't warrant the veracity of a PD claim. For the winner the expression of regret might indicate simply that he would have liked to have obtained the spoils of victory with less of a struggle, without, however, relinquishing the desire to obtain those spoils.
Hence, the situation is not a PD but a conflict over who will be First Violin, as it were. Conflict is an inescapable and often valuable element of social order, as explained by Louis Coser (1956) Tullock is neither gloomy nor pessimistic. He is nothing if not a sober realist. There is plenty of reason to think that conflict with be with us always.
Among other things, property rights are nothing but the residues of conflicts that have been settled, for now anyway though not forever. Fifty years ago you could have smoked a cigarette nearly anywhere you chose. This is not so today.
Property rights have been modified through conflict. These ebbs and flows in the range of allowable human actions is something that Tullock neither applauds nor bemoans, but simply recognizes that these are a continuing feature of life in 20 society. In other words, for Tullock the Social Dilemma is not a state of affairs to be escaped through appropriate constitutional action but rather is an eternal condition of life in human societies. Within such societies, the force of the dilemma might be ameliorated to some extent, but it won't be abolished.
A wonderful illustration of Tullock's thought in this respect is his treatment of mutual disarmament (Tullock 2005, pp. 311-53 Tullock explores the PD formulation from the inside looking out. When he does this, he sees that mutual disarmament will make war more likely because it has made war more profitable for both potential participants. If disarmament imposes proportionate reductions on the power of each participant, it will have had no effect on the probabilities of waging a successful war. After disarmament, however, a successful war of conquest can be waged more cheaply by the conquering power and, moreover, will inflict less damage on the conquered nation, thereby increasing its value to the conquering nation.
Looking for Social Dilemma: East of Eden or West of Babel?
Philosophers of science note that any theorist operates with some hard core propositions from which the analytical efforts spring, and with those propositions themselves being taken as given data for analytical purposes.
Those hard core propositions are species of creation myth, in that they provide the raw fuel that propels the subsequent analytical efforts. Any analysis must have a point of origin. Theists posit God, as illustrated by the assertion (John 1:1) that "In the beginning there was the Word, and the word was God." Atheists posit the primeval concentration of energy that suddenly exploded billions of years ago. In either case a creation myth is invoked to generate a starting point, simply because we must start somewhere. represented by a field, so each tribe would now be represented as a field and not a network. The relationship among tribes would still be represented as a network, and in this context it would be possible to examine the waxing and the waning of size of various tribes within the network, as well as changes in the pattern or degree of concord and discord among the tribes.
Tullock engages in such theorizing himself when he examines balance of power as a means of preserving a good deal of peace by planning continually for war (Tullock 2005, pp. 354-67 Tullock (2005) and not . This alternative reference is to volume 8 of Tullock's Selected Works, which is now the volume that is available. This book, however, is an amalgamation of and Tullock (1987) , which is Tullock's subsequent treatment of autocracy. The spontaneous order orientations of the two books by the same name are identical, but a reader should note that subsequent references to The Social Dilemma will sometimes actually be references to Tullock's Autocracy. This situation will cause no confusion to a reader who has seen only Tullock (2005) , but a reader who has seen only may find attributions to The Social Dilemma that do not appear there because they appeared in Tullock (1987) instead.
